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SPOUSAL EXEMPTION TO RAPE
Universally, rape1 is seen as a truly reprehensible crime, a
crime of violence that not only damages the body, but which
also leaves great scars on the mind. Legislatures have acted
forcefully against such invasions of a woman's person,3 giving
courts the means to punish the crime.' Yet, for reasons that
will be explored in this comment, legislatures and courts
throughout England and the United States have covered their
eyes, closed their ears and sealed their mouths to one of the
great inconsistencies in law, the common law sanction of a
husband's rape of his wife. 5 A husband not only may demand
that his wife consent to sexual intercourse, but should she re-
fuse, he can threaten her with any weapon at his disposal; in-
deed, he can use physical force to secure his wishes.6 He is, for
the most part, above the law.
Of course, application of this exemption can lead to ridicu-
lous results. For instance, a man can lie in wait and attack
and rape an unsuspecting woman, and if it turns out that that
woman is his wife, he cannot be prosecuted. Contrarily, if a
man should rape a woman whom he believes to be his wife,
and it turns out that the marriage is void, presumably he can
be prosecuted." Suddenly he has become culpable.
There is no great, impressive body of law supporting the
commonly accepted position that a man cannot be guilty of
1. Throughout this comment, when the word "rape" is used, the author intends
the following definition: Sexual intercourse by a man who compels a woman to sub-
mit by force, threat of death or serious bodily injury or extreme pain; or has used
drugs, intoxicants or other means to impair her power to appraise or control her con-
duct; or sexual intercourse with a woman who is unconscious. MODEL PENAL CODE §
213.1(1) (1980).
2. See generally S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975).
3. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 940.225 (1979).
4. Id.
5. For the origins of the common law sanction, see discussion, § I, A infra.
6. Of course, if the effect of the husband's force meets the elements of assault and
battery, the wife can bring charges in that area. However, the harm punished by the
crime of assault and battery does not reach the harm accomplished in a rape. See
discussion, § I, B infra.
7. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23
U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 293, 295-96 (1975), in which the author deals with justificatory de-
fenses to crimes and the theory that such defenses should be available only to those
whose intent is meritorious.
8. English, The Husband Who Rapes His Wife, 126 NEw L.J. 1223, 1224 (1976).
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raping his wife.9 Indeed, most courts that have considered the
issue seem to have accepted it as a given, a proposition that is
so universal as to preclude discussion. 10 In truth, enunciation
of the spousal exemption dates to 1736, when Lord Matthew
Hale wrote: "But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape com-
mitted by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given up her-
self in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract."1"
Hale also spoke of the ease of charging rape and the diffi-
culty of disproving the charge, evidencing his belief in what
now would be called the "cry-rape" syndrome. 2 Furthermore,
his thoughts along this line have been incorporated into the
instructions at rape trials in some jurisdictions." All of that
has led some commentators to attack Hale, along with the
outdated theory of a spousal exemption.14 Yet while the vari-
ous facets of Hale's personality make interesting reading, and
give some arguable insight into why Hale believed as he did,
such considerations remain unimportant. What matters is
that the essence of a statement made over two hundred years
ago is still embodied in statutes15 which affect peoples' lives.
This comment will discuss the reasons for the spousal exemp-
tion, review case law and statutory treatment, and argue that
the spousal exemption should be relegated to history.
9. See State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977), aff'd, 169 N.J.
Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981). The
trial court's excellent treatment of the issue, although not dispositive of its holding, is
cited throughout this comment.
10. 148 N.J. Super. at _ 372 A.2d at 388. But see the discussion in 85 N.J. at
-, 426 A.2d at 40-45.
11. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1st Am. ed. 1847) [hereinafter cited as
HALE].
12. Id. at 633.
13. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 399 A.2d 194 (Del. 1979). But see, e.g., People v.
Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975) (Judge refused
to give instruction).
14. Barry, Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 1088 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Barry]; Geis, Rape-in-Marriage: Law and Law Reform in England, the
United States, and Sweden, 6 AnL. L. REv. 284, 286 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Geis]. Both authors make reference, for instance to Hale's alleged misogynism and his
presiding over witch trials.
15. See discussion § I, D infra.
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I. THE SPousAL ExEMPTION TO RAPE
A. Historical Rationales
Hale's pronouncement is the first recorded recognition of
the marital rape exemption. But the idea that a husband
could not rape his wife probably had its roots in the related
theories of the wife as chattel and the unity of marriage, in
which a woman was presumed to lose her identity after mar-
riage."6 As Blackstone wrote: "[T]he very being or legal exis-
tence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the hus-
band: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
everything .. ."17
Indeed, prior to enunciation of Hale's rule, the interrelated
concepts of contract/implied consent, wife as chattel, and
unity of marriage had existed in English rape laws. For in-
stance, an alleged rapist could avoid punishment if the victim
accepted the attacker as her husband." And during the reign
of Henry III, a rapist could defend himself by claiming the
victim once had been his mistress.1" In fact, some commenta-
tors believe that rape laws were developed primarily to pro-
tect men's property interests in their wives or daughters as
sexual objects.2 0 Hale himself, however, cited no authority for
his proposition, and in an early English case,2 l Judge Field
said in dissent, "[I] should hesitate before I adopted it."2
Judges in England and America, unfortunately, have not
been affected by the same sense of hesitancy. By accepting
the common law exemption to rape given a husband and
trumpeted by Hale, they are necessarily accepting the reasons
for the exemption contained in Hale's pronouncement. Hale
spoke of consent given and contract formed when the matri-
16. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.1, Comment 8(c) (1980).
17. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441 (Sharswood ed. 1859) (emphasis in
original).
18. Comment, The Marital Exception to Rape: Past, Present and Future, DET.
C.L. REv. 261, 263 n.13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Marital Exception to Rape].
19. Id.
20. Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306, 309 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Marital Rape Exemption]; Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism
in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REv. 919, 924-25 (1973).
21. Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23 (1888).
22. Id. at 57.
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monial act takes place.23 These are the commonly and all-too-
readily accepted reasons for the exemption - that by con-
senting to marriage, a woman forges a contract which makes
her body available to her husband at anytime.2 4 Of course,
Hale made the consent irrevocable, 5 meaning that the woman
is always available.
Indeed, courts that have chosen to accept this doctrine
blindly26 have accepted, perhaps unwittingly, some shocking
ramifications. One only has to look at Pollock's statement in
Regina v. Clarence,7 one of the first cases to apply Hale's
doctrine, to discover what type of pronouncements survive in
this area of the common law. Speaking of the "connection,"
i.e., sexual intercourse, between husband and wife, Pollock
said, after quoting Hale, "Such a connection may be accompa-
nied with conduct which amounts to cruelty, as where the
condition of the wife is such that she will or may suffer from
such connection . . .,.
Not only have statements like Pollock's attached them-
selves to the exemption, but the contract/implied consent the-
ory relied on by Hale, Pollock, and the courts and legislatures
that have considered it, for however short a time, does not
provide much current support for retaining the common-law
exemption to spousal rape. Simple historical perspective
shows that the theory is no longer viable. As one English
judge has pointed out, marriage was for all purposes irrevoca-
ble at the time Hale defined the common law, so it followed
that a wife's consent would be irrevocable too.2 ' Today, of
course, marriages are ended with what might be considered
substantial frequency.
There is also a double standard operative here. A wife is
presumed to consent irrevocably to sex, yet courts have been
more than willing to ignore an implied consent theory, born of
the marriage contract, when rape is not involved. For in-
23. HALE, supra note 11, at 629.
24. Comment, The Marital Rape Exemption: Legal Sanction of Spouse Abuse, 18
J. F m. L. 565, 567 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Legal Sanction].
25. HALE, supra note 11, at 629.
26. State v. Smith, 85 N.J. at -, 426 A.2d at 43.
27. 22 Q.B.D. 23 (1888).
28. Id. at 64.
29. Regina v. Miller, [1954] 2 Q.B. 282, 286.
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stance, a wife is not presumed to consent to assault and bat-
tery, yet in many states, all the husband must do to legitima-
tize his assault is to combine it with rape.30 This is true even
though states have taken the position that one cannot consent
to serious bodily harm, such as that which results from exces-
sive fraternity hazing and excessive violence in sports.31
Consent has been ignored in other areas involving marital
sex. Courts have granted divorces on the basis of excessive
sexual demands3 2 and have refused to grant divorces when a
partner has been denied sex for a period of time.-3 Also, in a
nonmarital rape situation, a woman may be found to have
consented one night but not the next, even if the same man is
involved.34 The same woman would not have that privilege of
nonconsent if she had wed the man between the two episodes.
The consent theory especially suffers in situations involv-
ing spouses who are separated. A woman's moving out of the
house that she shared with her husband would seem to offer
strong evidence of a lack of consent, yet in many jurisdictions
the husband in that situation is still protected from rape laws,
even, in some cases, if the wife has begun divorce
proceedings.3 5
The contract that breeds this implied consent is likewise a
strange creation. It cannot be thought of as a typical commer-
cial-type contract, where two parties agree to certain terms,
bargaining at arm's length. For one thing, the state is involved
in the so-called marriage contract from the outset, and that
involvement is continued even beyond the day that the con-
30. Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 20, at 311-12.
31. Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. Cmi. L.
REv. 613, 640-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Towards a Consent Standard].
32. See, e.g., Cimijotti v. Cimijotti, 255 Iowa 77, 121 N.W.2d 537 (1963) (husband
insisted on sexual relations almost every night).
33. See, e.g., Dominik v. Dominik, 7 N.J. 198, 81 A.2d 147 (1951) (wife's refusal of
normal sexual relations for three weeks did not amount to extreme cruelty, especially
in absence of any substantial damage to'husband's health).
34. In fact, according to at least one court, a woman (not the wife of the perpetra-
tor) can withdraw her consent prior to the act of penetration, even if she has con-
sented right up to that time. Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Md. 1980). But
evidence of prior consent can be used as impeachment testimony if the same man is
involved. Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 272 N.W.2d 320 (1978).
35. See discussion, § I, D infra.
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tract is revoked.38 The state is not merely an observer, but an
"interested party. '3 7
Furthermore, there is some question about the nature of a
contract which may be enforced by whatever means one party
chooses, including violence. This surely exceeds the tradi-
tional contract remedies. The whole idea of viewing the mar-
riage agreement in strict contract terms, with consent to on-
demand sex as part of it, is ludicrous when taken to the
extreme.38
If the contract/implied consent reasoning is dispensed
with, and the ancient theories of wife as chattel and unity of
marriage are decreed to be buried under a wealth of legisla-
tion intended to give a wife equal rights in a marriage,3 9 only
the practical considerations that are advanced against the ab-
olition of the spousal exemption remain.
B. Practical Considerations
A number of reasons have been advanced for retaining the
spousal exemption to rape, and by far the most popular is
that there will be insurmountable proof problems if a wife at-
tempts to bring rape charges against her husband. The basic
elements required to establish rape are: (1) lack of consent,
(2) use of or threat of use of force, and (3) penetration.40 Of
these, the consent element would be the most difficult to
prove. Even though the marriage situation should not give ei-
ther party a right to sex on demand, it does give rise to a
natural inference of consent based on the relationship itself.
Yet consent is a difficult element to prove in any rape
case,41 especially where the parties involved have had previous
sexual relations. 2 Such problems do not keep the case out of
36. M. PLoscowE, SEX AND THE LAW 3 (1951).
37. Id.
38. Consider, for example, the application of traditional contract and related rem-
edies. Shall the husband take the wife to court and sue for damages when she refused
sexual intercourse? Should he, in appropriate fact situations, try promissory estoppel,
breach of warranty and so on?
39. E.g., Property Rights of Married Women, Wis. STAT. ch. 766 (1979).
40. 65 AM. Jun. 2d Rape §§ 2-7 (1972).
41. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. at -, 372 A.2d at 389. See generally To-
wards a Consent Standard, supra note 31.
42. Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again - A Legal Fallacy in
Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. L. REV. 127; 143-46 (1975).
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court, however, inasmuch as the judicial system is presumed
capable of dealing with the issue.4
In State v. Smith," a New Jersey case involving spousal
rape, the prosecution in the trial court advanced a limited ap-
plication of the rape statute to husbands. It suggested that
there be a rebuttable presumption of consent by the wife-vic-
tim, plus a requirement of more-than-minimal physical vio-
lence by the husband.45 Certainly, the elimination of the
spousal exemption, even accompanied by the additional proof
handicaps, would be an improvement. However, the wife re-
mains disadvantaged. If she claims rape, why should she be
subjected to a stricter burden than any other woman who
claims rape? The act and the lack of consent are the same in
each case.
Another reason advanced by those who would keep the ex-
emption is the possibility of false charges being filed by the
wife to exact vengeance or to gain an advantage in property
settlements in divorce actions. 46 This approach, however,
demonstrates little understanding of the human psyche, and
the natural shame and embarrassment that would attend any
revelation of a rape by one's husband.'7 Also, false charges can
be filed in connection with any statutory crime, and the judi-
cial system deals with the problem daily.48 But because it is a
wife pressing rape charges against her husband, the talk is of
fabrication. No such talk is heard when a wife brings charges
against her husband for assault and battery, fraud and, nota-
bly, sodomy, all crimes in which the husband is not protected
by the law.4" Yet the excuse of fabrication is heard when the
subject is the serious one of rape.
Some observers feel that the sanctity of marriage would be
jeopardized by an elimination of the exemption, because all
possibilities of reconciliation would be destroyed.5 0 In its com-
43. Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 20, at 315.
44. 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977), aff'd, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d
331 (1979), reo'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
45. 148 N.J. Super. at -, 372 A.2d at 391.
46. Id. at -, 372 A.2d at 389.
47. BROWNMILLER supra note 2.
48. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super at -, 372 A.2d at 389.
49. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); State v. Smith,
148 N.J. Super. at -, 372 A.2d at 389.
50. Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV.
[Vol. 65:120
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ments to the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute
says that abandoning the exemption "would thrust the pros-
pect of criminal sanctions into the ongoing process of adjust-
ment in the marital relationship. '51
Both propositions ring hollow. The former assumes that a
marriage which has reached the stage of a wife's prosecution
of her husband for rape is capable of being saved at all. The
latter makes essentially the same argument, assuming that
forcible rape of one's wife is a matter to which a wife can ad-
just. Perhaps shi can, but a wife should not be forced to make
such adjustments.
Others avoid the issue entirely, and suggest that the wife
has other means at her disposal, such as actions for assault
and battery and divorce.52 The crime of assault and battery,
however, is premised on a different type of harm from that of
rape.5 3 Rape leaves a stigma that other crimes do not; it "sub-
jugates and humiliates" 54 the woman. As the Massachusetts
Supreme Court has said, "The essence of the crime is not the
fact of intercourse but the injury and outrage to the feeling of
the woman by the forceful penetration of her person. It is a
crime radically different from assault and battery ....
Furthermore, if assault and battery are adequate substitutes
for rape, then the penalties should be similar .5  Apparently,
the legislatures are aware of the vast difference in harm to the
victim.
As to the argument that divorce is an alternative, the
trial court in Smith found little use for that reasoning. Said
the court, "It is small comfort to a married woman whose hus-
band has forcibly ravished her against her will to know that
719, 725 (1954).
51. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.1, Comment 8(c) (1980).
52. Id. See also State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super, at , 372 A.2d at 390.
53. Marital Exception to Rape, supra note 18, at 275.
54. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. at - , 372 A.2d at 390.
55. Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 338 Mass. 377, _, 155 N.E.2d 187, 191-92
(1959).
56. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 940.19(2) (1979) (Aggravated battery, a Class C felony,
punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to 10 years); Wis. STAT. § 940.225(1)
(1979) (First degree sexaul assault, a Class B felony, punishable by imprisonment of
up to 20 years).




she may resort to the matrimonial courts to recapture or re-
trieve her right to sexual privacy. 5 8 Also, as has been men-
tioned before, a wife can remain vulnerable right up to divorce
in many jurisdictions.59
The modern reasoning that supports the exemption is




The approach to the spousal exemption to rape in England
should be examined to determine how English judges have
coped with Hale's doctrine. Regina v. Clarence, ° mentioned
previously in connection with Judge Pollock's comments,61 in-
volved a husband's having sexual relations with his wife even
though he knew he had gonorrhea. The case did not involve
rape, but the prosecution introduced it to make the point that
if the wife had resisted, the husband would have been guilty
of rape. That gave the thirteen King's Bench judges an oppor-
tunity to consider that issue, and several seized upon it, Pol-
lock being the most notable.2 The case also is often cited for
a dissent by Field, in which, the possibility of a criminal
charge in the right case is mentioned. 3
Three more English cases have varied the theme. In Re-
gina v. Clarke," decided sixty-one years after Clarence, the
court said that a separation order that explicitly cut off sexual
rights would leave a husband liable for rape, but affirmed
Hale's doctrine in other situations. 5 In Regina v. Miller66 the
Clarke rationale was applied to a husband who forced his wife
to have intercourse after she had petitioned for divorce. The
court found that although assault could be found,67 rape could
58. 148 N.J. Super. at -, 372 A.2d at 390.
59. See discussion, § I, D infra.
60. 22 Q.B.D. 23 (1888).
61. Id. at 64. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 57.
64. [1949] 2 All E.R. 448.
65. Id.
66. [1954] 2 Q.B. 282.
67. Id. at 292.
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not, because the divorce proceedings had not gone far
enough." Finally, in Regina v. O'Brien, the wife had a pre-
liminary decree of divorce. The court decided that the pro-
ceedings had in fact gone far enough and that the husband
was liable.70
2. In the United States
Case law involving marital rape is sparse in the United
States, and one can only speculate as to the reasons. Reluc-
tance of women to even attempt prosecution of their hus-
bands certainly is one reason. And, perhaps, as has been sug-
gested, those who do wish to prosecute are informed of the
concomitant problems by prosecutors, who advise the wives to
drop the charges or pursue assault and battery instead. 1
Much of the case law that does exist does not meet the
issue with factual situations that are precisely on point. For
instance, there are cases that hold that the spousal rape ex-
emption does not apply when a husband aids and abets in the
rape of his wife by a third party.7 2 No cases can be found con-
tradicting that rule. There are other cases dealing with the
pleadings of a rape charge or the instructions at a rape trial,
and whether the complaint and the instructions must specifi-
cally state that a victim was not the wife of the defendant."
There are still other cases in which a husband is found guilty
of forcible sexual perversion on his wife. "
However, cases involving a husband's rape of his wife, with
no third party involved, are not abundant. The first case on
record which mentioned the doctrine at all concerned a proce-
dural question on the framing of the complaint. In Common-
wealth v. Fogerty,5 the court ruled that it was not necessary
to put the "not his wife" language in the complaint. But that
court used the occasiofi to mention that a defense to the
68. Id. at 290.
69. [1974] 3 All E.R. 663.
70. Id. at 665.
71. Geis, supra note 14, at 286.
72. See, e.g., State v. Drope, 462 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1971). As the court mentions in
that case, no cases can be found contrary to the holding that a husband can be found
guilty of raping his wife if he assists a third person. Id. at 680.
73. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977).
74. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976).
75. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857).
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charge of rape would be that the victim was the wife of the
defendant.7 6 The defendant's attorney cited Hale to bolster
his case."
Another early case, State v. Haines,s is not directly on
point either, but involved a related issue. The husband was
found guilty as an accessory to the rape of his wife, and was
imprisoned for life, but the principal was acquitted and the
husband appealed. After terming the issue a "unique and
novel" question, 9 the court found that the conviction could
not stand, even though the husband had forced sexual inter-
course upon the wife, because "of the matrimonial consent
which she has given, and which she cannot retract."80
The first American case directly on point was Frazier v.
State,81 in which a wife attempted to divorce her husband,
but was refused a divorce by the court. She therefore stayed
in the same house, sleeping in a bedroom with her daughter
while her husband supported her and she did the "ordinary
duties devolving upon the wife in regard to household mat-
ters."82 The husband thereafter forced himself upon his wife,
the wife brought charges, and the court restated the common
law, declaring that "all the authorities" held that a man could
not rape his wife."'
The implied consent theory was followed again in State v.
Parsons . 4 In that case, a divorce had been granted, and the
husband's plea that sexual intercourse had been accomplished
by mutual agreement was to no avail. The consent had been
terminated by the divorce. The same situation applied in
Baugh v. State.8 5 Even though the judge did not sign the
judgment of divorce until six days after it had been granted
(the husband had raped the wife the day it had been granted),
the court found that all the issues had been adjudicated, and
76. Id. at 491.
77. Id. at 490.
78. 25 So. 372 (La. 1899).
79. Id.
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905).
82. Id. at - , 86 S.W. at 754.
83. Id.
84. 285 S.W. 412 (Mo. 1926).
85. 402 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
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the marriage had ended.8 6 Reliance on such technicalities is
needed when the common law is adhered to in this area.
Several state trial courts have dealt with the exemption re-
cently, including the widely publicized State v. Rideout.
817
Rideout was the first case brought under Oregon's revised
statute,8 8 which allowed for prosecution of the husband. The
husband was acquitted by a jury, but commentators point out
that the case did not offer a clear factual picture, and that it
was thus not a good test of the statute's effectiveness.8 9
Another case, State v. Chretien,90 involved a Massachu-
setts statute91 that made no mention of the exemption al-
though the jurisdiction had, of course, adopted the exemp-
tion. 2 In this case, however, the couple was living apart,
awaiting a final divorce decree, and the husband was
convicted.
Two other recent cases have touched the issue peripher-
ally. In State v. Bateman,93 the husband attempted to use pri-
vacy arguments grounded on Eisenstadt v. Baird94 and Gris-
wold v. Connecticut95 to avoid a conviction for forcing his wife
to commit oral sex upon him. The court recognized that a wife
could refuse that variety of sex but made no mention of sexual
intercourse.
In People v. Hartwell,96 a wife accused of murdering her
husband claimed she was defending herself from sexual at-
tack. The judge, in his instruction to the jury, said that "[A]
married woman is not compelled by law to submit against her
will to sexual contact which she finds offensive. ' 9
7
The most encouraging and well-developed case law treat-
ment of the issue thus far was provided by the various New
86. Id. at 769.
87. No. 108866 (Marion County, Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 27, 1978).
88. OR. REv. STAT. § 163.375 (1979).
89. Legal Sanction, supra note 24, at 579; Barry, supra note 14, at 1091.
90. Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1979.
91. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West 1974).
92. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857).
93. 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976).
94. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
95. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. No. 75-0911591-7M (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 1976).
97. Marital Rape Exemption, supra note 20, at 321.
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Jersey courts which considered State v. Smith.98 Albert Smith
was accused of raping his estranged wife on the basis of a New
Jersey statute which made no mention of the spousal exemp-
tion9 and which had never been specifically construed by the
state courts as including the common law approach.100 Smith,
of course, claimed that the statute should continue to be in-
terpreted to include the exemption. The trial court, in a well-
reasoned and lengthy opinion, critically traced the history of
the exemption and the reasons for it. 101 However, the court
deferred to the legislature, 102 as did the intermediate appellate
court on appeal, 103 pointing out that the statute was in the
process of revision.
When the Supreme Court of New Jersey took the case,
New Jersey had enacted its new statute eliminating the
spousal exemption. 04 Nevertheless, the court, dealing with
the old statute because of its application to Smith, surveyed
the common law and decided that the existence of a spousal
exemption "is not as obvious as the lower courts here or
courts in other jurisdictions have believed." 0 5 The reason for
the court's doubt was its belief that the rule could not have
been meant to apply to revocable marriages. 06
For purposes of inquiry, the court presumed that some
form of exemption had existed when New Jersey drafted its
old statute from the common law. The question, said the
court, was whether the exemption existed when Smith raped
his wife in 1975.107 The court found that Smith was not cov-
ered by an exemption, and although the court limited its
holding to the facts of the case, specifically the fact that the
Smiths were separated, 0 8 it noted that an exemption might
98. 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977), aff'd, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d
331 (App. Div. 1979), reu'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
99. 99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1 (West 1977).
100. State v. Faas, 39 N.J. Super. 306, 121 A.2d 69, aft'd, 42 N.J. Super. 31, 125
A.2d 724 (App. Div. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 940 (1957).
101. 148 N.J. Super. at -, 372 A.2d at 389-91.
102. Id. at -, 372 A.2d at 393.
103. 169 N.J. Super. 98, -, 404 A.2d 331, 333 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J.
193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5 (1979).
105. 85 N.J. 193, -, 426 A.2d 38, 43 (1981).
106. Id. at , 426 A.2d at 42-43.
107. Id. at , 426 A.2d at 43.
108. Id. at -, 426 A.2d at 45.
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not apply even if they had not been separated.
The court's limited holding was a disappointment, given
the fact that the legislature already had spoken and the court
gained nothing by forsaking a broad holding. Also, the court
had conducted a lengthy survey of what it called the three
major justifications of the exemption - the wife as property;
the husband and wife as one; and the implied, irrevocable
consent of Hale.109 The court devoted most of its treatment to
the final justification, stressing the fact that if marriages could
be terminated, especially in states with so-called no-fault di-
vorce, consent could not be irrevocable." More importantly,
the consent could be revoked before the marriage was legally
terminated, as in separations."'
Thus, the most recent case, although limited in its holding,
is the most encouraging appellate decision yet. Perhaps legis-
lators can be similarly persuaded.
D. Statutes
Although commentators often perceive some progress
when they look at legislative action in regard to marital
rape,1112 the fact remains that with a few exceptions, it is legal
for a husband to rape his wife in any state in the United
States. In some cases, this is true even if they are living apart.
Furthermore, several states not only give the exemptions to
husbands, but to men who live with women without being
married.1 3 There are instances in which the same state has an
exemption for rape but no exemption for sexual perversion or
sodomy. 1 4
Seven of the jurisdictions, Florida, 5 Georgia,1  Massa-
chusetts, 1 7 Mississippi, 8 Nebraska,' 9 Virginia 120 and the
109. Id. at , 426 A.2d at 43-44.
110. Id. at -, 426 A.2d at 44-45.
111. Id.
112. Geis, supra note 14, at 303.
113. See, e.g., HAWAII RE.. STAT. § 707-730 (Supp. 1980); ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60
(1977).
114. See, e.g. ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401, -1404 to -1406 (1978).
115. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (1976).
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1977).
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22 (West Supp. 1981).
118. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1981).
119. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-319 (1979).
120. VA. CODE 18.2-61 (Supp. 1981).
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District of Columbia121 are silent on the spousal exemption.
That is, rape is defined in the statute absent the "not his
wife" language, and there is no other place in the statute, such
as the definition section, wlere the exemption is mentioned.
Courts in these states probably can be presumed to apply the
common law exemption if called upon,122 if past practice in
other states can be used as an example. 123
Eleven of the states still have an express exemption for
spouses, or, if they have not made the non-generic leap, for
husbands. 124 Those states are Alabama, 12 5 Connecticut, 126 Illi-
nois, 12 Kansas,128 Montana, 129 Oklahoma, is0 South Dakota,"'1
Texas,"12 Vermont,"' Washington" 4 and West Virginia."s5
South Dakota, in fact, eliminated the exemption one year,"6
then added it the next."17
Other states ignore the exemption under certain circum-
stances, with several clear patterns. Ten states"38 require that
the wife have a judicial decree of divorce or separation in
hand before the exemption is eliminated. Thus, a wife can
move out of the house, get an attorney, file for divorce and be
waiting for a court date and still be subject to her husband's
121. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2801 (West 1967).
122. See, e.g., State v. Chretien (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1979).
123. See, e.g., State v. Drope, 462 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1971).
124. Louisiana, for instance, has changed from "not the wife of" to "not the
spouse of." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (West Supp. 1981).
125. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 (1977).
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65 (West Supp. 1981).
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (Smith/Hurd 1979).
128. KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3502 (Vernon 1974).
129. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503 (1979).
130. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 1951).
131. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1981).
132. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.02 (Vernon 1974).
133. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1981).
134. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040 (Supp. 1981).
135. W.VA. CODE § 61-8B-1 (1976).
136. 1975 S.D. SEss. LAWS.
137. 1976 S.D. SEss. LAWS.
138. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:41 (West Supp. 1981); MD. CRIMES & PUNISHMENT CODE ANN. § 464 D (1976); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 566.010 (Vernon 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00 (McKinney Supp.
1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-01 (1976); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 11-37-1 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (Supp. 1981); Wyo.




Five states, including Wisconsin, 3 9 require that the parties
be living apart and that an action be filed. Ohio140 requires
that an action be started or that a written agreement exist.
South Carolina 41 requires that the parties be living apart, and
there be a high degree of physical injury.
Nine states' 42 require merely that the parties be living
apart, although there are variations from state to state.
Alaska1 43 will prosecute if the parties are living apart or if
there is a physical injury. In Nevada,'" New Hampshire 45
and New Mexico' 46 the parties can continue to live together,
but the wife will be protected if she begins an action for sepa-
ration or divorce. In Pennsylvania,14 7 a decree or an agree-
ment will protect the wife if she decides to continue to live in
the same residence as the husband. Idaho' 4s protects the wife
if she has started proceedings or if she has lived apart for 180
days. One commentator suggests, with some force, that a de-
nial of equal protection may exist when a wife who moves out
of the house is protected even though she remains married,
while a wife who stays at home is not protected. 149 That, of
course, is a problem with the statutes that attempt halfway
measures.
One state is particularly difficult to classify. Arkansas is
silent in its rape statute1 50 on spousal exemption, but uses the
139. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §
750.520(1) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West 1975); TEN. CODE ANN. § 39-
3709 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. § 940.225(6) (1979).
140. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1907.01 (Baldwin Supp. 1980).
141. S.C. CODE § 16-3-658 (Supp. 1980).
142. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445 (1978); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401, -1404 to -
06 (1978); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-409 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1979); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251-52 (Supp. 1981); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(E) (1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
143. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445 (1978).
144. NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.373 (1979).
145. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1979).
146. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(E) (Supp. 1981).
147. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
148. IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1979).
149. Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 MICH. J.L. REF. 217, 233
(1974).
150. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803 (Supp. 1981).
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"not his spouse" language in regard to other sexual offenses." 1
The remaining states have made the most progress in
sending Hale's doctrine back to the eighteenth century. While
the New Jersey court was busy leaving it up to the legislature
in Smith, 52 the legislature was revising the rape laws to ex-
clude the spousal exemption.153 The statute now reads, "No
actor shall be presumed to be incapable of committing a crime
under this chapter because of age or impotency or marriage to
the victim."' "
Oregon had done the same, 55 and California also revised
its statutes to eliminate the spousal exemption, 5 ' but the Cal-
ifornia statute requires resistance overcome by force or
threats of "great and immediate bodily harm.' 57 Thus, for ex-
ample, a husband could drug his unsuspecting wife, or wait
until she was unconscious, before having intercourse with her,
and escape the bite of the California statute. The Model Pe-
nal Code endorses this approach, pointing out that a man who
has sexual intercourse with his unconscious wife "should
scarcely be condemned to felony liability on the ground that
the woman in such circumstances is incapable of consenting to
sex with her own husband, at least unless there are aggravat-
ing circumstances.' 58 Violating the person of a woman who
has not consented, no matter what the circumstances, should
be enough.
Iowa,159 Delaware'"0 and Hawaii'' attempt to meet the
problem by classifying rape by degree. In Iowa, the husband is
liable for first or second degree sexual abuse, which involves
serious injury, the use of a deadly weapon or the threat of
death or serious injury.162 The husband cannot be prosecuted,
however, for third degree sexual abuse, which involves the use
151. Id. at §§ 41-1804 to -1810 (Supp. 1981).
152. 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (1977).
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5 (Supp. 1981).
154. Id.
155. OR. REv. STAT. § 163.375 (1979).
156. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1981).
157. Id.
158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment 8(c) (1980).
159. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1-.4 (West 1979).
160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 763-64 (1979).
161. HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-730, -731 (Supp. 1980).




Delaware and Hawaii are similar, in that in both states a
defense to first degree rape is that the female is or has been a
voluntary social companion. In Delaware, if the woman is a
voluntary social companion on that occasion, and has allowed
the man sexual contact in the past, the man is exempt.1T In
Hawaii, the woman must be a voluntary social companion who
had permitted the defendant to have sexual intercourse
within the past twelve months. 165 In both states, a husband
can be charged with the lesser crime of second degree rape,1 66
doing some damage to Hale's rule, but the Delaware and Ha-
waii approaches are discouraging nonetheless. In both states,
the wife's prior submission precludes a charge of first degree
rape, and in Delware, it makes no difference how long ago that
submission occurred. In Hawaii, a woman can have sexual in-
tercourse with a man on January 1 and be raped by him on
December 30, and the man will have a defense to first degree
rape. According to the comments to the Hawaii Penal Code, a
person "who resorts to sexual aggression against a female who
has permitted previous sexual intercourse, and who has
thereby furnished to some extent an incentive to further amo-
rous advances, presents less of a social danger .... For-
tunately, that thought is not shared by all of the states.
II. CONCLUSION
The foregoing should be illustrative of what prospects a
wife faces when her husband decides to have sex with her by
force. The courts, with few exceptions, are not sympathetic,6 8
and even if some sympathy does surface, the court may defer
to the legislature6 " - a body which, for the most part, retains
archaic rape laws that sanction brutal conduct by the
husband.17 0
163. Id. at § 709.4.
164. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 764 (1979).
165. HAWAii REV. STAT. § 707-730 (Supp. 1980).
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1979); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 707-731 (Supp.
1980).
167. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 731, Comment (Supp. 1980).
168. See discussion, § I, C supra.
169. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. at - , 372 A.2d at 393.
170. See discussion, § I, D supra.
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The raped wife has few options. She can protest to her
husband, yet he is armed with the law. If she is fortunate
enough to live in a jurisdiction that eliminates the exemption
when the parties live apart, she can move out.171 If not, she
must file for separation or divorce, and even then, in some
jurisdictions, the husband can continue to rape her without
fear of prosecution. 172 Some legislatures would have the wife
produce a judicial decree of divorce or separation or a serious
injury to be protected.1 7
That this situation can exist in allegedly enlightened judi-
cial and legislative systems is truly incredible. This approach
to martial sex should long ago have been abandoned, yet it
lingers today, denying a wife the protection inside her home
that she would have against any stranger out on the street.
Lip service is paid to ancient notions of contract and consent
and marital stability; 7 4 wives are insulted by those who insist
that an end to the spousal exemption would lead to false
charges,' 75 and the legal system is insulted by charges that it
could not cope with such a change. 78 A tested, true and
adaptable legal system will not be sabotaged by a measure
that provides fundamental justice to a significant number of
people.
Rape is a heinous crime, even if it is accomplished behind
the veil of a marriage license. It involves a special kind of
harm, different from that in other violent crimes. 77 It leaves
revolting aftereffects.178 It is time for American legislatures
and courts to reject the reasons for allowing this crime the
sanction it receives in marriage. A wife should be allowed to
say, "I won't."
MICHAEL J. GONRING III
171. However, it is not always easy for a battered wife to leave her home, for
economic and psychological reasons. Barry, supra note 14, at 1091.
172. See discussion, § I, D supra.
173. Id.
174. See discussion, § I, B supra.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Marital Exception to Rape, supra note 18, at 275-76.
178. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. at -, 372 A.2d at 390.
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